This paper studies the relative performance of alternative monetary policy rules in the presence of oil price shocks in a small open economy optimizing model. Our analysis shows that it is important to distinguish between alternative price indices (CPI, core CPI, and GDP deflator) when modeling the effects of oil price increases. This distinction has important implications for monetary policy as the central bank has to decide which inflation rate to target. Our results demonstrate that targeting the change in the GDP deflator is an inferior monetary policy strategy in the presence of oil price shocks.
Introduction
The surge in oil prices in the course of 1999 and 2000 and the following downswing of the world economy have led to renewed interest in the question whether oil price shocks cause recessions or whether monetary policy is at the root of the observed slowdown in economic activity. The first line of reasoning received support from the extensive empirical work of Hamilton (1983) and, more recently, Hamilton and Herrera (2000) who argued that all large oil price increases after World War II caused recessions in the United States. The second interpretation was favored by Bernanke et al. (1997) and has recently received additional support from Barsky and Kilian (2001) . These authors argue that oil price increases alone cannot generate large and persistent declines in output, but that monetary policy is responsible for the observed losses in production. To date, neither of these two interpretations has emerged as the consensus view.
In the recent theoretical literature, the effects of oil price increases on output have received a lot of attention while the interaction between oil price shocks and monetary policy has in general not been addressed. Important work in the area has been done by Kim and Loungani (1992) , Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) and Finn (2000) . These studies have in common that they investigate the macroeconomic effects of oil price increases in a dynamic general equilibrium setting. Kim 
and Loungani as well as Finn
analyze the impact of oil price increases under perfect competition, while Rotemberg and Woodford do so in an imperfect-competition framework. Finn as well as Rotemberg and Woodford show that their models generate realistic output dynamics in response to an exogenous oil price increase. None of theses studies, however, allows for a role of monetary policy since they abstract from sticky prices. Moreover, the above studies analyze the effects of oil price shocks in closed-economy settings. By that assumption they exclude a potentially important transmission mechanism, namely that oil price increases involve a transfer of income from oil-importing to oil-exporting countries.
This transmission mechanism is included in Backus and Crucini (2000) who analyze the effects of oil price shocks on the terms of trade in a three-country real business cycle
model. Yet, again there is no explicit role for monetary policy.
This paper addresses the interplay between oil price shocks and monetary policy in a small open economy setting. We employ a variant of the dynamic sticky-price monetary model developed by McCallum and Nelson (1999) . Their model belongs to the new open macroeconomics literature initiated by the work of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) .
The important new feature introduced by McCallum and Nelson (1999) is that imported goods serve as an input good to domestic production. Therefore, their model is a leading candidate for the analysis of the effects of oil price shocks on the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables. Modeling oil as an input factor is in analogy to the models used by, e.g., Finn (2000) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) in which oil also serves as a production factor.
We extend the McCallum and Nelson (1999) model by assuming that imports serve as both an input good in domestic production and as a final perishable domestic consumption good. This extension allows us to distinguish between three price indices:
the consumer price index (CPI), the deflator of gross domestic production (GDP), and the core CPI (all items less energy). In line with empirical evidence, our model predicts that oil price shocks drive a wedge between these three price indices. This has important implications for the conduct of monetary policy. Given the different responses of the price indices to oil price shocks, the central bank faces the problem which inflation rate to target. In theoretical work on optimal monetary policy, it is generally assumed that the central bank targets CPI inflation (Clarida et al. (2001) ). In closed economy models without capital formation, the choice does not make any difference because all three price indices coincide. 1 In open economy models, however, these three price indices do not move together for all shocks. In empirical work on monetary policy rules, in contrast, it is often assumed that the change in the GDP deflator is the relevant target variable (see, e.g., Taylor (1993) and Clarida et al. (2000) ).
Our results demonstrate that the assumption on the targeted inflation measure is not innocuous whenever the economy is hit by an oil price shock. We show that for shocks other than oil price shocks, it does not make a large difference whether the central bank targets CPI inflation, core inflation, or the change in the GDP deflator. In contrast, our results suggest that in the presence of an oil price shock, GDP deflator targeting turns out to be a suboptimal strategy. Rather, core inflation targeting seems to be a good strategy, as has also been shown by Aoki (2000) in a recent paper on the impact of relative price changes on inflation fluctuations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present stylized facts on the dynamics of the three price indices and discuss the implications for monetary policy rules of the type suggested by Taylor (1993) . In Section 3, we lay out our formal model. In Section 4, we analyze the properties of our model by means of impulse response functions and numerical simulations. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
Alternative Inflation Measures and the Taylor Rule: Some Stylized Facts
To illustrate our argument, we first report some stylized facts on the behavior of different inflation measures over time. All data used in this section are taken from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
-Insert Figure 1 about here - Figure 1 depicts the evolution of CPI inflation, core inflation (all CPI items less energy), and changes in the GDP deflator in the period 1959-2001 for the United States.
As can be seen from this figure, the three inflation measures are highly correlated over the entire sample. They deviate from each other, however, in all those periods during which large oil price changes occurred (shaded areas in the figure). This is especially true for the second oil price shock, which hit the U.S. economy in 1979-1980. The figure shows that the increase in CPI inflation was very strong during this period. In comparison, the increase in core inflation and the change in the GDP deflator were less pronounced. In the seventies, inflation was already on the rise before the respective oil price shocks occurred. This has recently been highlighted by Barsky and Kilian (2001) who argue that loose monetary policy in the seventies contributed to the rise in inflation and in oil prices. While it is true that monetary policy may have been the main source of rising inflation, it is also true that the divergence of the different inflation measures must be attributed to the evolution of oil prices.
This divergence of the different inflation measures is the focus of this paper as it has important implications for the conduct of monetary policy. A large body of literature,
following Taylor (1993) , shows that monetary policy can be well described by means of simple rules. A simple rule similar to the one originally suggested by Taylor (1993) takes the form t i t i t t y dp dp
, where t R is the Federal funds rate, t ỹ denotes the CBO output gap, and i t dp the inflation rate. 2 The index i stands for CPI inflation, core inflation, or changes in the GDP deflator, respectively. In line with
Taylor, we assume that the long-run equilibrium real interest rate and the inflation target of the central bank are both equal to 2.0 percent. that the nominal interest rates implied by these rules depart from each other during periods of oil price shocks.
In the following, we present a model which is able to capture the dynamics of the various measures of inflation and thus of nominal interest rates during periods of oil price shocks. With the help of the model, we can determine which inflation measure the central bank should target.
The Model
Our model is a variant of the dynamic general equilibrium small open economy model developed by McCallum and Nelson (1999) . The economy is inhabited by a continuum of infinitely-lived consumer-producer households, indexed by
. Each household produces a differentiated good and sells its output in a monopolistically competitive goods market. The output of the differentiated good produced by household j in period
. The production technology is described by a constant elasticity of substitution production function: 
where t v denotes a preference shock and 1 0 
, where
The quantity of the domestically produced goods that the household consumes is defined in terms of the CES basket of goods
The consumer price index (CPI), CX t P , is defined in terms of the minimum expenditure required to buy one unit of the consumption index ) ( j CX t and is thus defined as: 
We also assume that the law of one price holds for imported consumption goods, so that
denotes the foreign currency price of imported consumption goods.
The consumption-based deflator of the index of domestically produced differentiated goods, i.e., the gross output deflator, is given by:
where ) ( j P t denotes the price of a differentiated domestically produced good. The consumption demand of domestic households for the foreign good is then given by:
The demand of domestic households for the composite differentiated good is given by:
The domestic demand for each differentiated good can be expressed as:
Foreigners' demand function for the household's exports is of a similar format (see McCallum and Nelson (1999) ): 
. In this index, * O t P denotes the foreign currency price of oil and * R t P denotes the foreign currency price of all other goods consumed by foreign households.
We further assume that the domestic household takes as given the aggregate consumer price index, CX t P , the gross output deflator, C t P , the nominal exchange rate, t S , and the foreign variables. Because there are no impedime nts to trade in our model, the law of one price holds for each individual good. The household may not price discriminate, so the export price of the composite domestic good, X t P , is equal to
The price of imported consumption goods in terms of domestic currency units,
can be computed by taking
. Similarly, the domestic currency price of good j and its foreign currency counterpart are linked through the relation
We next derive the period budget constraint facing a domestic household. To this end, we assume that the domestic household j is not only an employer of labor but is also endowed with one unit of potential work-time each period. The nominal wage paid for one unit of work effort is given by t W . The domestic household supplies this potential work-time inelastically to the domestic labor market, implying international immobility of labor. Given these assumptions, the period budget constraint facing household j reads: 
( )
where t λ and t ξ denote the Lagrange multipliers on constraints (11) and (1) (14) and (15) yields the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition:
Flexible Price Output
We next derive an expression for flexible price output, t Ŷ , which we will use in the following to calculate an expression for the output gap. With flexible prices, the loglinear approximation to Eq. (1) can be used to compute 
where
. Together, the expression for flexible price output and Eq. (18) imply:
where (19) shows that flexible price output depends upon technology and is inversely related to the relative price of oil.
Price Setting
Since household j has monopoly power on the market for the differentiated good it produces, it treats the price it charges as a further choice variable. We therefore need to specify a price adjustment mechanism for ) ( j P t . Once the price-setting rule is specified, the quantity produced by the household can be derived from the demand function for this product. We assume that households behave according to a priceadjustment mechanism similar to the one introduced by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) , which assures an empirically reasonable degree of inertia in inflation dynamics. It stipulates that inflation, measured as the increase in the price index of the domestically produced goods, is a function of the output gap, t t t y y y− ≡ , and of the weighted arithmetic average of lagged and expected inflation:
y dp E I dp dp
where Ψ is a positive constant and
ε is a stochastic disturbance term.
3.3
The Price Indices
The various price indices arising in our model play a central role in the interplay between oil price shocks, monetary policy, and macroeconomic dynamics. The consumer price index, CX t P , and the gross output deflator, C t P , were already defined in Eqs. (3) and (5), respectively. We now use these price indices to derive an expression for the GDP deflator. In addition, we discuss how the price indices implied by our model differ from those presented in McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2000) .
To derive the GDP deflator, we assume that the economy has settled in a symmetric equilibrium in which all domestic households are identical. We define gross output as 
where we have dropped constants. Straightforward calculations show that the loglinearized versions of the consumer price index and the gross output deflator are given
by: 
From the definition of the domestic CPI it follows that
and thus
Combining these results, the GDP deflator can be formally expressed as:
with
Thus, in our model, the GDP deflator is a function of the consumer price index, of the gross output deflator, and of the domestic currency price of the imported goods.
-Insert Table 1 about here - Table 1 summarizes the log linearized versions of the price indices implied by our model. These price indices can be compared with the price indices arising in the model developed by McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2000) . In their model, the imported good is exclusively used as an input good in the production of the domestic good. In our model, in contrast, imported goods serve both as an input factor in domestic production and as a final consumption good. Thus, the McCallum-Nelson model is a special case of our extended model. Our model degenerates to their model when we invoke the assumption
. Under this assumption, the CPI only comprises the prices of domestically produced goods. This, in turn, implies that the CPI is equal to the gross output deflator.
Moreover, under the assumption that 1 = α , an oil price shock exerts no direct effect on the consumption-based price indices. Only the GDP deflator, which can be expressed as
in the McCallum-Nelson version of our model, is directly affected by the shock hitting the price of the imported good. In our model, in contrast, an oil price shock exerts a direct effect on both the CPI and the GDP deflator.
Whereas the impact of an oil price shock on the GDP deflator under the assumption that 1 = α is unambiguously negative, the sign of the impact of an oil price shock on this deflator in our model depends on the relative magnitude of the coefficients α and 1 ω ,
i.e. on the share of imported consumption goods in total consumption and on the steadystate share of total consumption in gross output, respectively.
Model Solution
The equations of the log linearized model include Eqs. (18) - (20), the price indices summarized in Table 1 , the UIP condition, and the log linear versions of the real exchange rate, the output gap, and exports (Eq. (9)). In addition, we need the national income identity
where 1 ω and 2 ω denote the steady state shares of consumption and exports in gross output, respectively. Finally, log linearizing Eqs. (12) and (14), we obtain:
To solve the model we use the algorithm developed by Klein (2000) . The calibration of the model is given in Table 2 and closely follows McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2000) .
In comparison with them, we have to specify some additional parameters. First, we have to specify the share of imported goods in total consumption, α − 1 . We assume that this share ta kes on the value 0, 0.1 or 0.2, respectively. In the McCallum-Nelson model, this share is zero. Second, we assume that the share of oil imports in total consumption imports, γ , is equal to 0.5. R y dp dp R
where π denotes the inflation target of the central bank,
ε is a stochastic shock term, and 1 µ and 2 µ are parameters that capture the reaction of the central bank to deviations of the inflation rate from its target level and to the output gap. All variables are measured at quarterly frequency. The interest rate smoothing objective of central banks (Goodfriend (1991) ) is reflected in the parameter 3 µ .
The key new element of the monetary policy rule given in Eq. (28) is the inflation term, i t dp , which allows three alternative cases to be discussed. We separately analyze monetary policy regimes in which the central bank reacts either to the change in the gross output deflator (core inflation), or to the change in the consumer price index (CPI inflation), or to the change in the GDP deflator. Accordingly, we set } , , { DEF CX C i ∈ in Eq. (28).
Impulse Response Analysis
To analyze the dynamic properties of the model, we have to specify the numerical values of the parameters in the monetary policy rule given in Eq. (28). We assume that the parameters 1 µ and 2 µ take on the numerical value 0.5 and 0.25, respectively. To compute the impulse responses given in Figures 1 and 2 , we further set 3 µ equal to 0.8. Figure 3 shows the response of changes in the GDP deflator, CPI inflation, and core inflation to an oil price shock for different numerical parameter values assigned to the share of consumed imports in total consumption. In the first panel of the Figure, we set 1 = α , which means that oil is solely used as an input in domestic production. In the second and third panel, we set 9 . 0 = α and 8 . 0 = α , respectively. In these cases, oil is also used as a final consumption good. To compute the impulse responses plotted in the figure, we set C i = in Eq. (28), that is, the central bank responds to deviations of core inflation from its target level.
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The first panel of the figure depicts the inflation dynamics that obtain when imports are not used as a consumption good. In this case core inflation and CPI inflation are the same. It can be seen in the figure that the GDP deflator decreases in the period the oil price shock hits the economy. This is in sharp contrast to CPI inflation, which remains roughly unchanged. The changes in the GDP deflator and the CPI start to resemble each other beginning in the period following the oil price shock. Clearly, the observation that core and CPI inflation coincide is at variance with the stylized facts presented in Section 2.
As can be seen in the second panel of Figure 3 , these stylized facts are nicely captured by the modified model suggested in this paper. The graph shows that, while core inflation increases only moderately in the aftermath of an oil price shock, CPI inflation increases on impact. The GDP deflator again declines immediately after the shock, but the extent is smaller than in the upper panel. The reason is that, even for a relatively small share of oil in total consumption, the CPI is driven up by the oil price shock, which, in turn, implies that the impact of the oil price shock on the GDP deflator is dampened.
The consequences of increasing the share of oil in consumption to 10 percent can be seen in the third panel of Figure 3 . In this panel, the GDP deflator remains roughly constant in the period when the oil price shock occurs. This is due to the fact that the CPI strongly increases at the same time. This compensates the increase in import prices that ceteris paribus exerts a dampening effect on the GDP deflator. ) and the central bank targets the change in the GDP deflator, the real exchange rate strongly depreciates in response to an oil price shock. This is due to the pronounced decrease in the nominal interest rate, which leads to a depreciation of the nominal and, because of sticky prices, of the real exchange rate.
The dynamics of the nominal interest rate and, thus, of the exchange rate strongly influence the response of potential output, the output gap, and consumption to an oil price shock. The response of potential output is exclusively determined by the relative price of oil (see Eq. (19)), which in turn depends on the real exchange rate. A real depreciation of the exchange rate or a rise in the oil price increase the cost of imported inputs and lead to a decline in potential output. The decline in potential output, thus, is largest if the central bank targets the change in the GDP deflator.
The response of output is less clear-cut. On the one hand, private consumption declines because of the loss in purchasing power. On the other hand, export demand is stimulated if the real exchange rate depreciates. Output increases in the immediate aftermath of the shock if the rise in export demand overcompensates the decline in private consumption. This is the case if the central bank targets the change in the GDP deflator and if oil is not a consumption good. In all other cases output declines.
However, the output gap increases in all these cases because the decline in potential output is always larger than the decline in output.
Simulation of the Model
We targeting as studied by McCallum and Nelson (1999) . We follow them and define nominal income growth as C t t t dp dy dx + ≡ . The performance of these four rules is evaluated along three dimensions. First, we vary the parameters of the monetary policy rules. Second, we study the influence of varying the share of oil in total consumption on the relative performance of these rules. Third, we investigate whether the central bank should react differently to oil price shocks than to other shocks hitting the economy.
To code up the simulations, we generated 100 times series of the endogenous variables of the model, each time series consisting of 200 observations. We repeated this procedure 100 times. For each simulation run, we calculated the standard deviation of the output gap, the three inflation rates, and the nominal interest rate. This gave us 100 standard deviations for these variables. Finally, we computed the arithmetic average and the standard deviations for these series. The performance of the rules is summarized by the arithmetic averages. The standard deviations of the latter are used to assess the significance of the differences between the rules. Tables 3-5 summarize the simulation results. income abroad, and price setting shock). We report results for the case in which the share of oil in total consumption is 5 percent ( 9 . 0 = α ) and 10 percent (
respectively.
4
To assess the robustness of our results, we also present simulation results for two alternative parameterizations of the monetary policy rules. Table 4 gives results for the case in which the central bank does not respond to the output gap (strict inflation targeting). In comparison with our benchmark simulation we set the parameter 2 µ equal to zero. Table 5 depicts simulation results for the case in which the central bank strongly responds to the deviations of the inflation rate from the target ( 0 . 2 1 = µ ). In additional simulations (not reported) we also investigated whether our results depend on 4 The main results reported in the remainder of this section are qualitatively the same if we set 0 . 1 = α , which means that oil is not a consumption good. Note, however, that in this case one cannot distinguish between CPI inflation and core inflation. the parameter 3 µ , which summarizes the extent to which the central bank smoothes the interest rate. The general impression that emerged from these simulations was that our results are robust even when we assume that the central bank does not smooth interest rates at all ( 0 3 = µ ).
-Insert Tables 3-5 If the central bank strongly responds to deviations of inflation from its target (Table   5) , the performance of a monetary policy rule based on the GDP deflator is once more by far the worst in the case of oil price shocks. Core inflation targeting again seems to be the preferable strategy as compared with nominal income targeting. As in the benchmark simulation, the differences between the monetary policy rules are rather small if all shocks but oil price shocks are used to simulate the model. Yet, core inflation targeting is always the dominant strategy in comparison with GDP deflator targeting.
Taken together, the tables also suggest that the larger the degree of openness in
) the higher is the standard deviation of CPI inflation and the lower is the standard deviation of the output gap and of changes in the GDP deflator. As concerns the different parameterizations underlying Tables 3-5 it can be seen that on average a policy of strict inflation targeting delivers worse results than either the benchmark policy rule or the one relying on a strong inflation response. This latter result is largely unaffected by variations in the degree of openness in consumption.
Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the relative performance of alternative monetary policy rules in the presence of oil price shocks. The existing literature so far has implicitly assumed that all prices move in the same direction and to the same extent when an oil price shock hits the economy. Our impulse response analysis indicates that it is important to distinguish between alternative price indices when modeling the dynamic effects of oil price increases on the economy. This has important implications for monetary policy as the central bank has to choose which inflation rate to target. In terms of policy conclusions, our simulation results suggest that targeting the change in the GDP deflator is an inferior monetary policy strategy in the presence of oil price shocks.
In general, our model suggests that core inflation targeting seems to be a good strategy.
Our results may also have important implications for empirical work. 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 CPI GDP deflator 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Core CPI GDP deflator Notes: The figure depicts impulse responses (deviations from steady state in percent) for the Taylor rule t R t t C t C t t R y dp dp R R y dp dp R Price indices (deviations from steady state) 
